Evolution in Knockout Contests: the Variable Strategy Case by Broom, M. et al.
Broom, M., Cannings, C. & Vickers, G. T. (2000). Evolution in Knockout Contests: the Variable 
Strategy Case. Selection, 1, 5 - 21.
City Research Online
Original citation: Broom, M., Cannings, C. & Vickers, G. T. (2000). Evolution in Knockout Contests: 
the Variable Strategy Case. Selection, 1, 5 - 21.
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/990/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders. Users may download and/ or print 
one  copy  of  any  article(s)  in  City  Research  Online  to  facilitate  their  private  study  or  for  non-
commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profit-making activities or any commercial gain. All material in City Research Online is checked for 
eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Evolution in Knockout Contests: The Variable Strategy Case
M. BROOM1*, C. CANNINGS2 and G. T. VICKERS3
1Centre for Statistics and Stochastic Modelling, School of Mathematical Sciences,
The University of Sussex, Sussex, UK
2Division of Molecular and Genetic Medicine, School of Medicine, Royal Hallamshire Hospital,
The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
3Department of Applied Mathematics, School of Mathematics and Statistics,
The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
(Received: 11 February 2000,
Accepted in revised form: 16 June 2000)
In a previous paper we introduced a model of a multi-player conflict in the form of a knockout tournament. Groups of
individuals resolved their disputes in a tournament in which in each round the remaining contestants formed pairs
who competed against each other: in such a contest between two individuals using behaviours x and y there was a
probability that each would win, and a cost incurred by the loser, both of which depended on x and y. The winner pro-
gressed to the next round of the tournament and the loser was eliminated; a player received a reward which depended
on how far that individual progressed. Individuals were constrained to adopt a fixed play throughout the tournament.
In this paper we extend the model by allowing individuals to vary their choice of behaviour from round to round. The
complexity of such systems is investigated and illustrated by both special cases and numerical examples. It is shown
that in this case behaviour is very different to the fixed strategy case.
Keywords: Multi-player games, dominance, ESS, knockout tournament, local strategy
1. Introduction
Game theory has a relatively short but valuable his-
tory in modelling the natural world, especially in the
area of animal conflicts. It has provided explana-
tions for apparently paradoxical situations, such as
the practice of heavily armed animals engaging only
in ritualistic contests (Maynard Smith, 1982) and the
tendency of (especially male) animals to develop ex-
tremely costly signals to acquire mates (Grafen,
1990a, b). The concept of an Evolutionarily Stable
Strategy (ESS), introduced by Maynard Smith and
Price (1973) has been especially useful, and has
been central to a large body of literature; some im-
portant examples being (Haigh 1975; Bishop and
Cannings, 1976; Maynard Smith, 1982; Cressman,
1992; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Most of this
work has concentrated on games between only two
players.
Game theory has its roots in economics originat-
ing with von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
(also see Alexrod and Hamilton, 1981 and Binmore,
1992), and multi-player games have always been
central to its theory. See Luce and Raiffa (1957) for
a general discussion, and a description of its applica-
tion to voting schemes. The authors have recently
written a series of papers developing multi-player
models of biological situations (Broom et al., 1996,
1997a, b, 2000). If it is supposed that individuals
come together in groups of size n and that each indi-
vidual freely selects its play, then it is necessary to
specify the payoff of each possible play against ev-
ery possible combination of plays chosen by the
other (n  1) individuals in the group. In Broom et al.
(1997b) this specification was made tractable by the
choice of the particular structure imposed, namely
symmetric finite contests [also see Cannings and
Whittaker (1994) for a similar treatment of the
multi-player war of attrition]. The others only allow
fights between pairs, but have these fights embed-
ded within a structure [for another example, see
Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin (1995) who
adopted a round-robin approach in modelling a
dominance hierarchy]. This paper, following on
Selection 1(2000)13, 521
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from Broom et al. (2000), adopts the latter approach,
modelling a multi-player conflict as a set of pairwise
games in a knockout tournament format. Of course
this will not reflect the precise behaviour of any real
population but will capture certain aspects of impor-
tance. For a more detailed rationale, see Broom et al.
(2000).
There now follows a reiteration of some two-
player game theory which is of relevance to work
later in the paper.
In the classical two-player conflict models it is
assumed that individuals compete in pairwise games
for some reward, food or mates perhaps. In the sym-
metric version, which is our concern here, all mem-
bers of the population are indistinguishable and each
individual is equally likely to meet each other indi-
vidual. There is a set S of choices available to each
player to play in a particular game, referred to as
pure strategies. Each contest results in a payoff to
each of the protagonists which is specified by some
a(x, y), the payoff to an individual who plays strat-
egy x when opposed by an individual who plays y; x,
y ˛ S.
Individuals do not need to play the same pure
strategy every time, they can play a mixed strategy
i.e. play x with probability (or probability density) px
for each of x ˛ S. The payoffs are presumed to be ad-
ditive over both the first and second argument, so
that, for example, if S = (S1,,Sn), the payoff to an
individual playing p against an individual playing q,
which is written as E[p, q], is given by
E a p qij i j
T[ ,p q] p Aq= =
å
where A is the matrix whose (i, j)-element is a(Si,
Sj).
p is an ESS of A if and only if, for all q „ p,
(i) E E[ , ] [ , ]p p q p‡ and
(ii) if E E[ , ] [ , ]p p q p= then E E[ , ] [ , ]p q q q> .
See Maynard Smith (1982) or Haigh (1975) for a
more detailed explanation.
The vector p is a Nash equilibrium if it satisfies
condition (i) above against all q „ p, but not neces-
sarily condition (ii) (see Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998). The concept of an ESS can easily be extended
to the multi-player case (see Palm, 1984 and Broom
et al., 1997b).
The model developed in Broom et al. (2000) pro-
vided a number of predictions. For the case where
the pairwise games were the classical HawkDove
game the more players, and hence the more rounds
that were played, the smaller the frequency of the
aggressive Hawk strategy amongst the population.
However, the frequency of individuals playing
Hawk in a particular contest could rise, since Hawk
individuals were more likely to progress to the later
rounds. In general the structure of the tournament
had a large bearing on the overall level of aggres-
sion, which could be both less than or greater than
that for independent games (and the difference could
be fairly large). The model also predicted a relation-
ship between the level of aggression in a population
and the degree to which rewards are unevenly split
amongst individuals, the concept of reproductive
skew first developed in Vehrencamp (1983).
It was shown that there may be many ESSs for the
type of knockout model described in Broom et al.
(2000), although if there are only two options avail-
able it is impossible to have no ESS. It was shown
that for the HawkDove case, there is a unique ESS,
which can be evaluated numerically via a formula
given in Broom et al. (2000).
1.1. The structure of knockout games
A knockout contest is a multi-player game which is
composed of a number of pairwise games. Initially
there are 2n players each of whom plays another
player in a pairwise game in which there is a win-
ner. The winners are then repaired in the next round
and this continues until there is one overall winner.
Players receive a reward according to which round
they were eliminated from the competition, usually
increasing with the number of rounds the player sur-
vives. Opponents in each round are chosen at ran-
dom, and we assume here that players do not differ
in any aspect which affects their performance, other
than the selection of strategies. Thus the organisa-
tion is similar to many human competitions, such as
the Wimbledon Lawn Tennis Championships, al-
though at Wimbledon individuals are not of equal
quality and there is a seeding system which keeps
apart the stronger players in the early rounds.
The main advantages of the knockout model are
that it breaks down a contest between a large number
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of individuals into a (relatively small) collection of
pairwise games, and it has one of the simplest con-
ceivable structures of pairwise games where every
individual starts from an identical position. How-
ever, as we shall see, interesting phenomena can be
observed from groups of as few as 4 players. The
disadvantage is that it is not realistic for a large
group of animals to form themselves into fighting
pairs in such an ordered way, although it is not un-
reasonable to think that a structure approximating to
the knockout model might occur in some circum-
stances. In addition large groups that are stable will
have already formed a hierarchy, and groups re-
forming may well have a memory of other individu-
als (see, for example, Barnard and Burk, 1979). So
the model may only be useful in considering groups
which form for the first time.
Initially there are 2n players who play a pairwise
game with one opponent such that there is a winner
and a loser. The loser is eliminated from the com-
petition and the winner enters the next round, where
the process is repeated with 2n1 players. This con-
tinues until the final round with only two players.
Define round k as the round with 2k players remain-
ing, i.e. the players start in round n, and the final
round is round 1. This is the opposite to the round
numbering system used in most sporting contests,
but is mathematically more convenient. Losers in
round k gain the reward V
k
, the overall winner re-
ceiving V
0
. It is assumed that V
k
‡ V
k + 1
(k = 0,,
n1).
The pairwise games which are played in the
knockout contest could be any game which has a
winner and a loser. As in Broom et al. (2000), we
consider a very simple game in this paper. The
pairwise game which is played in each round is de-
fined as follows:
Suppose that in each round there are available m
strategies labelled O
1
, , O
m
. These shall henceforth
be referred to as options. Terms such as mixed op-
tion will be used. The term strategy will be reserved
for the overall strategy specifying which option is to
be used for each round should the player progress to
that round. This specification may be probabilistic,
comprising all the options from each round. Let the
probability that a O
i
-player beats a O
j
-player be ‰ +
D ij, so that D ij + D ji = 0 and D ii = 0. In addition if a Oi-
player loses to a O
j
-player it incurs a cost c
ij
(a re-
ward c
ij
), which might correspond to an injury, or
loss of time or energy.
In Broom et al. (2000) each player used the same
option in each round. In this paper players may vary
their option from round to round. Note that the two
cases can be thought of as the two extreme cases out
of a set of possible types of game (see Broom et al.,
2000). Our conflicts each involve 2n individuals and
we envision a population which has a large (essen-
tially infinite) set of such conflicts. The set of 2n
players are selected at random from the infinite pop-
ulation of players.
2. A variable strategy
In this paper we allow players to change their option
from round to round. As opposed to the fixed strat-
egy case, and as in any two-player conflict, we do
not need to differentiate in any round as to whether
individuals are playing pure or mixed options; it is
only the overall population play which matters. We
find a recurrence relation for the evolutionary stable
play in round k conditional on all lower numbered
rounds (i.e. rounds later in the competition). The
term Evolutionarily Stable Option (ESO) is coined
for such play (formally defined in Section 2.2) and
we show that a collection of ESOs for each round
forms a Nash equilibrium. In Sections 2.32.6 we
consider the 2 and 3 option cases in more detail.
The type of contest that we consider has a lot in
common with extensive two-person games de-
scribed by Selten (1983) (see also Van Damme,
1991). Both games use a dynamic programming ap-
proach, finding optimal play at any stage of the
game conditional upon optimal play at later stages.
Selten (1983) uses the term local strategy for what
we call an option and any collection of local strate-
gies is referred to as a behaviour strategy. In case of
extensive two-person games the same two players
play at every stage, whereas in our game only one
player gets through to the next stage, and the proba-
bility of qualification depends upon the option used.
Nevertheless, there are many similarities between
the two games, and these are commented upon
throughout the paper.
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2.1. The equivalence of different strategy
combinations
For n rounds and m options, which we label O
1
, ,
O
m
, there are mn pure strategies (a selection of an op-
tion for each round). However, the same population
structure can be obtained from different mixtures of
these.
Consider the case where m = n = 2. The four pos-
sible pure strategies are S
11
, S
12
, S
21
and S
22
(the first
subscript is the option played in round 1, the second
in round 2). Let the proportions of S
ij
at the start be
r
ij
, so that
r
11
+ r
12
+ r
21
+ r
22
= 1
Further, let the proportion of O1-players in round 2
be p2 = r11 + r21, and the proportion in round 1 be p1.
The probability of a O
1
-player reaching round 1 is
‰ + D (1  p
2
) and for a O
2
-player it is ‰  D p2, where
D = D 12. Therefore
p
1
= [1 + 2 D (1  p2)]r11 + (1  2 D p2)r12.
Together with the equation p
2
= r
11
+ r
21
, this gives
two equations in three free variables, so that there
may exist a family of pure strategies which give the
same values of p
1
and p
2
. One can prove that there al-
ways exist such a solution with valid r
ij
. For exam-
ple, in case D = 1/2, p
1
= 1/2 and p
2
= 1/2 we have
such a family defined by r
11
= x, r
12
= 1  3x, r
21
= 1/2
 x and r
22
= 3x  1/2 for x ˛ [1/6, 1/3]. More gener-
ally there are mn pure strategies (i.e. mn  1 free vari-
ables) and only n equations. This phenomenon also
occurs for extensive two-person games, and is re-
ferred to as spurious duplication in Selten (1983).
In general a strategy is of the form (p1, , pn),
where the vector piT = (pi1, , pim) and pij is the prob-
ability of playing option j in round i. When m = 2 a
strategy is of the form (p
1
, , p
n
), p
i
being the proba-
bility that the player adopts option 1 in round i.
2.2. Evolutionarily stable options
Assuming that we know which strategies are going
to be played in later rounds, we can work out exactly
the expected payoff to a player for any given course
of action in the current round given the action of the
current opponent.
An option (i.e. the play in a particular round) can
be represented by a vector, and similarly the mean
option in a particular round is also represented by a
vector, with its kth entry representing the probability
that a randomly chosen opponent plays pure option
O
k
. We define an ESO for round j conditional upon
the mean option of the population played in later
rounds. As in Broom et al. (2000), we assume an ef-
fectively infinite array of contests between 2n play-
ers. Define the payoff E[r
i
, v
i
; r
1
, , r
i1
] as the ex-
pected payoff to a player playing r
i
against an
opponent playing v
i
in round i, when the mean popu-
lation option in round j is r
j
" j < i.
We define the ESO in a similar manner to an ESS
in a two-player game, as indeed a single round with
future behaviour fixed is just such a conflict. p
i
is an
ESO for round i conditional upon r
1
, , r
i1
if, for all
q
i
„ p
i
,
(i)E[p
i
, p
i
; r
1
, , r
i1
] > E[q
i
, p
i
; r
1
, , r
i1
] and
(ii)if E[p
i
, p
i
; r
1
, , r
i1
] = E[q
i
, p
i
; r
1
, , r
i1
] then
E[p
i
, q
i
; r
1
, , r
i1
] > E[q
i
, q
i
; r
1
, , r
i1
].
p
i
is a Nash equilibrium option if it satisfies condi-
tion (i) for all q
i
„ p
i
(it need not satisfy (ii)).
Hence we can work backwards from the final
contest using results from two-player game theory to
find an ESO for each round conditional upon ESOs
in later rounds (there may be none, in which case the
process breaks down, or more than one). These op-
tions then, collectively, form a Nash equilibrium
strategy (and possibly an ESS) for the whole game.
Such a collection is referred to as a Locally Stable
Strategy (LSS) in Selten (1983). Note that to have a
Nash equilibrium all that is required is a Nash equi-
librium option in each round conditional on future
rounds. It is proved by van Damme (1991) that for
the extensive 2-person game, any ESS is also an
LSS. It is easy to show that the corresponding result
is true here; namely that (p
1
, , p
n
) is an ESS only if
p
j
is an ESO in round j, conditional on lower num-
bered rounds, for all j. This is true since if p
1
, , p
j1
are ESOs of their respective rounds then p
j
must be
an ESO as well, otherwise there is a q
j
s.t. (p
1
, ,
p
j1
, q
j,
p
j+1
, , p
n
) invades (p
1
, , p
n
).
Note that only strategies of this form are resistant
to invasion from strategies a single mutation away
from them i.e. (p
1
, , p
j1
, q
j,
p
j+1
, , p
n
) any q,
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some j. This only prevents the invasion of these spe-
cific strategies, however, so that the condition is
necessary but not sufficient, as we see in Section 2.4.
2.3. The two-option case
We now consider the variable option case with just
two options. We define some terms useful for work-
ing out the ESO(s) in a given round (as a function of
the payoff parameters and Wk, the expected reward
for winning in round k). A recurrence relation is de-
veloped which finds the ESO(s) in round k condi-
tional on the ESO in round k  1 and all later payoffs,
and thus finds all candidate ESSs for the whole
game. We proceed to find when the candidate ESS
for the 4-player (2 round) case is an ESS (Section
2.4) and show how the dynamics of the system work
when it is not (Section 2.5).
Let W
k
be the expected reward for winning in
round k (including the costs expected to be in-
curred), i.e. for a player entering round k  1 (e.g.
W
1
= V
0
), and let D = D
12
as earlier and in Broom et
al. (2000). Further define the following terms:
C
c c
c C
c c
c1
22 12
12 2
11 21
21
2 2
=
-
+ =
-
-D D, ,
y C W V y C W Vk k k k k k= + - = - -
*
1 2D D( ), ( ),
a V V Ck k k= - ++D ( ) ,1 1
1
2
v
V V
k
i
k i k
i
k
= +
- -
=
-
å
2 2
0
1
1
1
.
Thus C
i
is the expected cost incurred by a O
2
-player
when playing an O
i
-player minus that of a O
1
-player
playing an O
i
-player. v
k
is the mean reward of a
player winning in round k not including future costs.
The relevance of y
k
, yk* and ak will be seen shortly.
It is now shown that the ESO for round k depends
upon y
k
and yk* in a simple way. The payoffs for
round k are given by the matrix,
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
M
W V c W V c W V c
W V c W
k
k k k k k k
k k
=
+ - + - + - +
+ - -
1
2
1
2
1
2
11 12 12
21
D
D ( ) ( )k k k kV c W V c- + + -
Ø
º
Œ
Œ
Œ
Œ
ø
ß
œ
œ
œ
œ
21 22
1
2
.
For example, when a O
1
-player plays a O
2
-player,
the probability of winning is ‰ + D with rewardWk ,
and the probability of losing is ‰  D with reward
V
k
 c
12
so that the O
1
-players expected payoff is
1
2
1
2
12+
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
+ -
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
-D DW V ck k( ).
The above is equivalent to a single-round two-player
game. For such a game with payoffs
a b
c d
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
there is a pure ESO (1, 0) if c  a < 0, a pure ESO
(0, 1) if b  d < 0 and a mixed ESO (p, 1  p) where
p
b d
b c a d
=
-
+ - -
,
when both c  a > 0 and b  d > 0. We shall, as in
Broom et al. (2000), assume that neither c  a nor
b  d are zero (these are non-generic cases). For ma-
trix M
k
c a
c c
c W Vk k- =
-
- - - =
11 21
21
2
D D ( )
C W V yk k k2 - - =
*
D ( )
b d
c c
c W Vk k- =
-
+ + - =22 12 12
2
D D ( )
C W V yk k k1 + - =D ( )
c b a d y y C Ck k+ - - = + = +
*
1 2.
This means that for round k there are ESOs as fol-
lows: yk* < 0 yields a pure O1, yk < 0 yields a pure O2
and yk > 0, yk* > 0 yields a mixed ESO (the propor-
tion of O
1
-players being y
k
/(C
1
+ C
2
)). There are two
different cases to consider:
(i) C
1
+ C
2
> 0, when an internal ESO is possible
and
(ii) C
1
+ C
2
£ 0 (if C
1
+ C
2
< 0 then two pure
ESOs are possible).
Thus if we can find the set of values of y
k
(and thus
yk* = C1 + C2  yk) for all values of k, i.e. (y1, , yn),
we can find the set of ESOs and thus the correspond-
ing candidate ESS. As we shall see, there may be
more than one such set (y
1
, , y
n
), and so more than
one candidate ESS.
Defining X
k
as the expected cost incurred by a
player in round k, in Appendix A it is shown that yk
satisfies the following recurrence relation
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y
y
a Xk
k
k k+ = + -1
2
D . (1)
Thus we have a recurrence relation for y
k
which also
includes a term a
k
which is known and X
k
which is a
function of p
k
which is itself a function of y
k
. Con-
sidering the two separate cases;
(i) C
1
+ C
2
> 0.
We define b
k
and z
k
as follows:
b
a
C C
z
y
C C
k
k
k
k
=
+
=
+1 2 1 2
, .
Using the recurrence relation (1) for y
k
, we obtain
y
y
a C C p pk
k
k k k+ = + + + - -1 1 2
2
1D ( ) ( )
1
2
111 22D [ ( )]c p c pk k+ -
Þ = + + - -+z
z
b p pk
k
k k k1
2
1D ( )
1
2
111 22
1 2
D
c p c p
C C
k k+ -
+
( )
(2)
and using the signs of the y
k
and inferring similar
signs for the z
k
we have that p
k + 1
takes the value z
k + 1
if this is between 0 and 1, the value 0 if z
k + 1
is less
than zero and the value 1 if z
k + 1
is greater than 1. So
if we know z
k
and p
k
we can find z
k + 1
and p
k + 1
i.e. if
the values of p
1
and z
1
are known then all the values
of p
k
(k = 1, , n) can be found. p
1
follows immedi-
ately from z
1
which clearly follows from y
1
= a
0
+
C
1
/2 (W
1
= V
0
), i.e.
z
a C
C C
1
0 1
1 2
2
2
=
+
+( )
.
So there is a unique ESO for each round, and thus a
unique candidate ESS.
Example 1
Consider the following set of payoffs.
V
0
= 7.5, V
1
= 6.5, V
2
= 0, c
11
= 25, c
12
= 0, c
21
= 11,
c
22
= 1, D = 0.5. For k = 1, that is the final round, we
have
M1 =
-
-
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
5 5 7 5
4 5 6 5
. .
. .
so that since c > a and b > d there is an internal ESO,
with p
1
= 0.5. The payoff to each option, and hence
to any mixed strategy, in a population playing the
ESO is 1. Thus W
2
= 1 and so the payoff matrix for
round 2, in a population which plays 0.5 in round 1 is
M 2 =
-
-
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
12 1
11 0
giving an ESO with p
2
= 0.5 and thus an overall can-
didate ESS p = (0.5, 0.5) and expected payoff 5.5
for the whole contest.
(ii) C
1
+ C
2
£ 0.
In this case there cannot be any pk which is not equal
to 0 or 1, i.e. p
k
(1  p
k
) = 0. If p
k
= 1 then X
k
= c
11
/2,
and if p
k
= 0 then X
k
= c
22
/2 i.e.
p y
y
a
c
k k
k
k= Þ = + -+1
2 2
1
11
D ,
p y
y
a
c
k k
k
k= Þ = + -+0
2 2
1
22
D .
We obtain the following relationship between p
k
and
y
k
.
If yk* < C1 + C2 then pk = 1 is the ESO.
If C
1
+ C
2
< yk* < 0 then yk < 0 and thus both pk =
0 and p
k
= 1 are ESOs.
If 0 < yk* then yk < 0 and so pk = 0 is the ESO.
As in case (i) if we have the values of p
k
and y
k
we
can also find the values of p
k + 1
and y
k + 1
. Similarly it
is easy to find the value of p
1
(the value of y
1
is a
0
+
C
1
/2 as before). However, in this case, the values of
p
k
may not be unique. If y
k
lies between C
1
+ C
2
and 0
then p
k
can be either 0 or 1, which in turn generates
two values of y
k + 1
, which generates more then a sin-
gle set of ESOs. This implies that while in case (i)
there is a unique candidate ESS (p
1
, , p
n
) in case
(ii) the number of candidate ESSs lies between 1 and
2n. In fact for case (ii), all candidate ESSs are really
ESSs, due to the fact that all of the ESOs are pure
strategies. If in any round k an individual does not
play a pure ESO, the value of W
k
for that individual
falls, and thus the payoff matrix M
k
for that individ-
ual is dominated by that for an individual playing the
ESO, which in turn implies that the same is true for
M
n
the payoff matrix for round n (the start of the
game).
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We will now consider some simpler examples
which can be evaluated more thoroughly. In all of
the following examples we will assume that the V
k
s
decrease linearly with k, i.e. V
k  1
 V
k
is constant so
that b
k
= b"k.
a) The HawkDove game
We examine the knockout tournament where the
pairwise contests follow the classical HawkDove
game of Maynard Smith (1982). In this game the
values of the parameters are as follows:
D = = > = = = Þ1 2 0 011 12 21 22/ , ,c C c c c
Þ = =C C C1 20 2, / .
C1 + C2 > 0 so that this game is of type (i), and thus
has exactly one candidate ESS. Thus the recurrence
relation for zk becomes
( )z z b p p
Cp
C
z
b
p
k
k
k k k
k
k k
+ = + + - - = + -1
2
2
1
2
1
1
4
1
2
2 2
.
If we further suppose that b < 1 (otherwise p
k
= 1 "k)
then p
1
= b and it is easy to show that z
k
must always
lie between 0 and 1 i.e.
p b p pk k k+ = + -1
1
2
1( ).
We first prove that the p
k
converge to some p as
k fi ¥ . If this is true, then we require p = b + p (1 
p)/2, and so p2 + p  2b = 0 Þ
p
b
=
+ -1 8 1
2
gives the equilibrium mixed strategy. Substituting
for b in the original recurrence relation, we obtain
p k+1 = p p p p pk k- - + -
1
2
1
1
2
1( ) ( )
Þ - +p p k 1 =
1
2
1
2
2
-
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
- + -p p p p pk k( ) ( )
Þ - +p p k 1 £
1
2
1
2
2
- - + -p p p p pk k
< p p p p p pk k k- + -
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
£ -
1
2
1
2
with equality only if p
k
= p, that is p
k
converges to p.
(If b
k
is not equal to b but converges to it, the same
argument will apply for p
k
provided that k is suffi-
ciently large.)
It can be shown that there are three different cases
depending upon the value of b:
(a) 0 < b £ 3/8: p
k
increases to a limit, p, say.
(b) 3/8 < b < (5  17)/2: p
k
initially increases to-
wards p and then approaches it in an oscillatory
fashion.
(c) (5 17)/2 < b < 1: p
k
approaches p in an oscilla-
tory fashion.
In Broom et al. (2000) the case where V
k
 V
k + 1
=
= D "k was considered for both C = 2D and C = 4D,
each for n = 1, , 6. We now revisit this example
and compare the two models. Note that here b
k
is
constant over k, and that b = D/C; we can thus use
the above working to find the candidate ESS for
each case. The ESO value of the probability of play-
ing Hawk in each round is shown in Table 1. The
ESO with k rounds to go is not affected by the total
number of rounds, and so the best play for any num-
ber of rounds n less than 6 is given by columns
headed 1, , n in Table 1.
This yields the expected number of violent Hawk
versus Hawk contests as shown in Table 2. The cor-
responding values for the fixes strategy case are
shown by way of comparison. It is clear that there is
far more conflict in the variable strategy case than
the fixed strategy case, for identical tournament
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TABLE 1
C = 2D, C = 4D the probability of playing Hawk in round k
k 1 2 3 4 5 6
C = 2D 0.5 0.625 0.617 0.618 0.618 0.618
C = 4D 0.25 0.344 0.363 0.366 0.366 0.366
TABLE 2
The proportion of Hawk v Hawk contests over the whole con-
flict; C = 2D and C = 4D
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 ¥
C = 2D, Fixed 0.25 0.282 0.280 0.270 0.262 0.257 0.252
C = 2D, Variable 0.25 0.344 0.365 0.374 0.378 0.380 0.382
C = 4D, Fixed 0.063 0.078 0.079 0.072 0.064 0.056 0.041
C = 4D, Variable 0.063 0.100 0.118 0.126 0.130 0.132 0.134
structures. Thus extra choice has greatly reduced the
payoffs to individuals. Of course, in a population of
fixed option players, an individual who plays a suit-
ably varied strategy would invade; evolution can re-
duce the fitness of the population.
b) Degenerate cases
b(i) If D = 0 then a player has a probability of win-
ning of ‰ whichever opponent it is playing i.e. the
reward V
i
attained is independent of the play so that
the game reduces to a series of pairwise games with
payoff matrix.
- -
- -
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
c c
c c
11 12
21 22
.
b(ii) If all the costs are zero then C
1
+ C
2
= 0 and
y
k + 1 =
y
k
/2 + a
k
. All the a
k
s are positive (since D > 0)
so that p
k
= 1 " k.
c) Symmetric costs with
c
12
= c
21
= 0, c
11
= c
22
= C > 0.
Here players incur a cost if losing to an opponent
playing the same strategy, but not if they lose to an
opponent playing the other strategy, as is perhaps
reasonable since the latter can be easily and quickly
resolved.
c
11
= c
22
= C Þ C
1
= C
2
= C/2 > 0
z
z
b p pk
k
k k k+ = + + - -1
2
1D ( )
1
2
111 22
1 2
D
c p c p
C C
k k+ -
+
=
( )
z
b p pk k k k
2
1
1
2
+ + - -D D( ) .
We have assumed that V
k
 V
k + 1
is constant over all
values of k. Define a by letting Ca = V
0
 V
1
, then
b
k
= 1/4 + Da so that
z
z
p pk
k
k k+ = + - + + -1
2
1
2
1
4
1D D Da ( ).
For a very large number of rounds p
k
will tend to a
constant value which is given by the equation
p
p
p p= + - + + -
2
1
2
1
4
1D D Da ( ),
if a is sufficiently small (otherwise p = 1 is the equi-
librium value). In case of the game when D = 1/2 i.e.
p p p p= - + Þ =
1
2
1
2
2
a a
for a < 1, otherwise p = 1. It follows that even
though the rewards are increasing in value and O
1
-
players have a better chance of progressing further
in the competition than O
2
-players for small a the
overwhelming number of players in the equilibrium
case play O
2
despite the symmetric appearance of
the costs. The reason for this is that for large values
of C the priority of the players is to leave the game
without incurring a cost, and for D = ‰ the only way
of achieving this is playing O
2
against a O
1
-player.
We now examine when such a candidate ESS
from case (i) is actually an ESS, considering the sim-
plest non-trivial case, namely the game with two
rounds.
2.4. Unstable equilibria
Consider the knockout game where there are two
rounds and two options. We assume that there is a
candidate ESS, labelled p, with (internal) ESOs p
1
in
round 1 and p
2
in round 2. Suppose that a group of
size ˛ playing q = (q
1
, q
2
) tries to invade a popula-
tion all of whose members play p. We evaluate the
expected payoff to a p-player minus the expected
payoff to a q-player and thus show when q can in-
vade. In particular we find conditions for when no
such q can invade i.e. when p is an ESS.
The mathematical arguments involved to show
this are in Appendix B. It is shown when q can in-
vade p, and that p is an ESS, if and only if
D D D2
1
2
0 1 21( )V V c- + +
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
-
ì
í
î
1
2
212
1
2
1 2-
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
ü
ý
þ
< +D c C C( ).
Note that V
2
does not appear in this inequality, so
that the value of V
2
does not affect whether our can-
didate ESS is in fact an ESS (of course V
2
affects the
value of p
2
; in particular p
2
is not internal unless V
2
lies within a certain range). For Example 1, we have
C
1
+ C
2
= 2 so that the right-hand side of the inequal-
ity is 2 2, while the left-hand side is 6, so that the
equilibrium strategy is not an ESS.
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There is a parallel with extensive two-person
games here, although not an exact one. Van Damme
(1991) showed that an LSS is not always an ESS
(see Cressman and Schlag, 1998 for a discussion on
when backwards induction is a useful method to
solve extensive form games). He constructed an ex-
ample, similar to the knockout idea, where players
either played a second stage or stopped after the first
stage, depending upon play at the first stage. In this
game either both players play a second stage or nei-
ther do, the mutant invading by playing so that mu-
tant v mutant contests were likely to play the second
stage, and playing cooperatively in the second stage.
In our game the situation is different; a player can
only increase its chances of progressing at the cost
of its opponent. The mutants either play aggres-
sively at first, so that more mutants reach the next
stage, and then play passively or the converse, as in
Section 2.5. Thus the mutant can indirectly make it
marginally more (or less) likely that the next oppo-
nent it faces is also a mutant, and behave accord-
ingly. This is a less effective mechanism than that
available in the two-person extensive games, so it is
reasonable to think that the knockout models are
more likely to have ESSs.
2.5. Petal dynamics in knockout games
2.5.1. The replicator dynamic
Suppose that for a particular evolutionary game, the
strategies which a player may play are S
1
, , S
n
(these may be pure strategies, or allowable mix-
tures as in the example we consider). Let the propor-
tion of players of S
i
at a particular time be p
i
(i = 1,
, n), so that the average population strategy is the
vector p = (p
i
), with the expected payoff (in terms of
Darwinian fitness) of an S
i
-player in such a mixture
being f
i
(p) and the overall expected payoff in the
population being F p p f pi i( ) ( )= å . Then the stan-
dard replicator dynamic (continuous) is defined by
the differential equation
dp
dt
p f p F pi i i= -[ ( ) ( )].
Thus the proportion of players which play the better
strategies increases with time (what determines a
good strategy depends upon the composition of the
population). A point in n-dimensional space, repre-
sented by the vector p, is locally stable if it is an ESS
[this is not necessarily true for the discrete dynamic
(Zeeman, 1980)]. The replicator equation has been
applied in very many situations (see Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1988).
We shall revisit Example 1. The parameters are
as follows:
V
0
= 7.5, V
1
= 6.5, V
2
= 0,
c
11
= 25, c
12
= 0, c
21
= 11, c
22
= 1, D = 0.5.
We have previously shown that (0.5, 0.5) is a Nash
equilibrium but not an ESS. In order to study the
possible invasion of a population playing v by some
alternative playing u we need to evaluate W
2
(u, v)
the expected future payoff to a u-player who wins in
round 2. We have u = (u
1
, u
2
) and v = (v
1
, v
2
) and
W
2
(u, v) depends only on u
1
and v
1
, and is given by
W
2
(u, v) = (u
1
, 1  u
1
) M
1
(v
1
, 1  v
1
)T. (3)
To illustrate we shall consider the set of nine possi-
ble strategies r
ij
, (i, j = 1, 2, 3) where r
ij
plays x
i
in
round 1 and x
j
in round 2, where x
1
= 0.1, x
2
= 0.5 and
x
3
= 0.9. Thus r
22
is the Nash equilibrium. Under this
regime, we have from equation (3) that
W
2
(r
ij
, r
kl
) = (x
i
, 1  x
i
) M
1
(x
k
, 1  x
k
)T,
which we denote by W
2
(i, k), since there is no de-
pendence on j or l, and the matrix W
2
of W
2
(i, k) ele-
ments for i, j = 1, 2, 3 is given in this case by
25
137 25 87
145 25 95
153 25 103
W2 =
-
-
-
Ø
º
Œ
Œ
Œ
ø
ß
œ
œ
œ
.
Now consider round 2. For strategies which play i
and k in round 1 we have payoff matrix M
2
(i, k) in
round 2 given by
M 2
2 2
2
25 2
11 1 2
( , )
( ( , ) ) / ( , )
( ( , ) ) /
i k
W i k W i k
W i k
=
-
- -
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
,
which we write as
M
2
(i, k) = W
2
(i, k) A + B (4)
where A is the matrix of probabilities of winning
and B is the matrix of expected costs. Thus the ex-
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pected payoff for r
ij
in a population of r
kl
players,
which we denote by M
2
(r
ij
, r
kl
) is given by
M
2
(r
ij
, r
kl
) = (x
j
, 1  x
j
) M
2
(i, k)(x
l
, 1  x
l
).
Substituting from equation (4) we have
M
2
(r
ij
, r
kl
) = A
2
(j, l)W
2
(i, k) + B
2
(j, l)
where A
2
(j, l) = (x
j
, 1  x
j
)A(x
l
, 1  x
l
) and B
2
(j, l) =
= (x
j
, 1  x
j
)B(x
l
, 1  x
l
), A
2
(j, l) and B
2
(j, l) being the
probability of winning in round 2 and the expected
costs, for a j-player against an opponent playing l in
that round. The matrices A
2
and B
2
, are given by
A 2 =
Ø
º
Œ
Œ
Œ
ø
ß
œ
œ
œ
0 5 0 3 01
0 7 0 5 0 3
0 9 0 7 0 5
. . .
. . .
. . .
,
25
38 145 252
35 150 265
32 155 278
B2 =
Ø
º
Œ
Œ
Œ
ø
ß
œ
œ
œ
.
The relative values of M
2
(r
ij
, r
kl
) =
(x
l
, 1  x
j
)M
2
(i, k)(x
l
, 1  x
l
) are given in Table 3.
By inspecting the entries in Table 3, we can iden-
tify those strategies which can invade any popula-
tion. A strategy u can invade a population playing v
if, in column-v (that is the column corresponding to
v) the entry in row-u exceeds that in row-v (i.e.
E[u, v] > E[v, v], or if these are equal then if, in col-
umn-u (that is the column corresponding to u) the
entry in row-u exceeds that in row-v (i.e. E[u, u] >
E[v, u]). For example only (1, 3) and (3, 1) can in-
vade (2, 2); that is only (0.1, 0.9) and (0.9, 0.1) can
invade the Nash equilibrium (0.5, 0.5). Table 4 con-
tains the complete set of information regarding
which strategies can invade which monomorphic
populations; if the entry in row (i, j) and column (k,
l) is + then the former can invade a population of the
latter.
We observe that there are sequences of strategies,
labelled {s
1
, s
2
, , s
u
} say, such that su invades s1
and s
i
invades si + 1 for i = 1, , u  1. In particular
{(0.5, 0.5), (0.5, 0.1), (0.9, 0.1)}
is such a set and we investigate the dynamics of this
particular set in more detail below.
2.5.2. Phase portraits for three strategies
For games with three strategies, the proportion in the
population of each of the strategies can be repre-
sented upon an equilateral triangle of unit height.
Since the triangle is equilateral the sum of the per-
pendicular distances from each edge is equal to the
height of the triangle, and thus is 1. Each strategy,
therefore, can be represented by one of the vertices
with the proportion of this strategy being the perpen-
dicular distance from the opposite edge. For exam-
ple, if the population all play strategy 1, then the cor-
responding point in the triangle is the vertex
representing that strategy; if the population plays
strategies 2 and 3 with equal probability, the corre-
sponding point is midway along the edge between
the vertices associated with strategies 2 and 3.
If we make a small disturbance away from the
equilibrium (adding a small proportion of players of
the other two strategies), the behaviour follows the
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TABLE 3
Relative payoff of strategy (i, j) (row-label), in a population
of (l, k)-players (column-label)
(1, 1) (2, 1) (3, 1) (1, 2) (2, 2) (3, 2) (1, 3) (2, 3) (3, 3)
(1, 1) 305 255 815 1039 1375 1711 2383 2495 2607
(2, 1) 345 255 855 1015 1375 1735 2375 2495 2615
(3, 1) 385 255 895 991 1375 1759 2367 2495 2623
(1, 2) 609 175 959 815 1375 1935 2239 2575 2911
(2, 2) 665 175 1015 775 1375 1975 2215 2575 2935
(3, 2) 721 175 1071 735 1375 2015 2191 2575 2959
(1, 3) 913 95 1103 591 1375 2159 2095 2655 3215
(2, 3) 985 95 1175 535 1375 2215 2055 2655 3255
(3, 3) 1057 95 1247 479 1375 2271 2015 2655 3295
TABLE 4
Specification of invasions possible
(1, 1) (2, 1) (3, 1) (1, 2) (2, 2) (3, 2) (1, 3) (2, 3) (3, 3)
(1, 1) 0  +   +  + +
(2, 1) + 0 +   +  + +
(3, 1) +  0  + +  + +
(1, 2) + +  0  +  + +
(2, 2) + +  + 0 +  + +
(3, 2) + +  +  0  + +
(1, 3) + +  + +  0  +
(2, 3) + +  +   + 0 +
(3, 3) + +  +   +  0
If (and only if) the entry is + for row-label (i, j) and column label
(l, k) then the strategy (i, j) can invade a population of (l, k)-play-
ers.
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pattern in Figure 1, with its path in the shape of a
petal (at least for small disturbances). The popula-
tion can move very far from the equilibrium if most
of the introduced group plays (0.9, 0.1) no matter
how small the disturbance (if the group is entirely
(0.9, 0.1) then the population follows the edge of the
triangle until the whole population plays (0.9, 0.1)).
The size of the petal decreases the larger the (0.5,
0.1) component in the added group, however as long
as this component is non-zero the population always
returns to the equilibrium. Hence even for a small
disturbance, the population can spend a long time
away from the equilibrium (which is unstable), but
the dynamic will move the population back to the
equilibrium eventually. This petal phenomenon
was discussed in Hofbauer (1993). There is another
parallel with extensive two-person games here.
Cressman (1997) proved that under certain condi-
tions solutions obtained using backwards induction,
as in Selten (1983), were locally asymptotically sta-
ble, so that the evolutionary dynamic eventually re-
turned the population to such a solution, even if it
was not an ESS; this is precisely what happens in our
case.
2.6. The three-option case
We now briefly examine the knockout game where
there are three options to show how the ideas already
discussed can be adapted to consider more than two
options. The payoff matrix for players in a particular
round conditional upon future rounds is shown and
an outline of how to find ESOs is given. In general
there may be up to three (or indeed no) ESOs of a
round for the three-option case, conditional on the
play in lower numbered rounds. We then describe
the conditions for which every ESO includes all
three options (and is thus unique).
Finding the ESOs
The rewards, costs and the probability of victory
against other strategies are as described earlier in
this section. Let W
k
again be the expected payoff for
winning in round k. For 2-player matrix games, sub-
tracting a constant from every element in a column
of a matrix does not affect the ESSs of that matrix
(Zeeman, 1980). Thus subtracting a constant from
the matrix of payoffs for round k does not affect the
ESOs of that round. We shall subtract the leading di-
agonal element from each column. Then the three-
player game has the following payoff matrix for
round k:
( )
( )
( )
( )
M
c c
W V c
c c
W V c
k
k k k k
=
- +
- +
- -
- +
0
1 2 1 222 12
12 12
33 13
31 13
/ /
D D
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 2
0
1 2
1 2
11 21
12 21
33 23
23 23
/ /
/
c c
W V c
c c
W V ck k k k
- -
- +
- +
- +D D
( )
( )
( )
( )
c c
W V c
c c
W V ck k k k
11 31
31 31
22 32
23 32
1 2
0
- +
- +
- -
- +
Ø
º
Œ
Œ
Œ
Œ
D D
/
Œ
Œ
Œ
Œ
ø
ß
œ
œ
œ
œ
œ
œ
œ
œ
.
Three strategy games and their ESSs are discussed
in Vickers and Cannings (1988), and their results
can be readily used to find the ESOs of the above
matrix.
An internal ESO is one in which the probability
of playing a given pure option is greater than zero
for all of the options. We can find a recurrence rela-
tion between ESOs in successive rounds in a similar
manner to Section 2.3. Defining r
k
= W
k
 V
k
and D
k
=
V
k
 V
k + 1
then equation (1) yields the following re-
currence relation for r
k
.
2r
k + 1
= r
k
+ 2D
k
 2X
k
Thus, since r
1
= V
0
 V
1
, we can find the value of rk
for every round and it is shown in Appendix C that
there is an internal Nash equilibrium (p
1k
, p
2k
, p
3k
)
where
p
y
y y y
ik
ik
k k k
=
+ +1 2 3
FIG. 1. Trajectories of the composition of the population for a 2-
round knockout game with three strategies. The marked trajec-
tories represent invasions into a population of (0.5, 0.5)-players
by a small group containing (0.9, 0.1)-players and (0.5, 0.1)-
players. As the proportion of (0.9, 0.1)-players increases the
petal enlarges
and
y r C r Ck k k1 23 11 12= + +D D
2
y r C r Ck k k2 31 21 22= + +D D
2
y r C r Ck k k3 12 31 32= + +D D
2
if y
ik
> 0 " i, where all the parameters Cij and D ij are
defined in Appendix C.
The Nash equilibrium is also an ESO if the matrix
satisfies the negative-definiteness condition of
Vickers and Cannings (1988). This depends upon
the costs only, and so if satisfied for one round it is
satisfied for all and vice versa. Thus it is possible to
generate the unique Nash equilibrium for the whole
game.
3. Discussion
The knockout model provides an example of a situa-
tion where all conflicts in a population are pairwise,
but are organised into a structure and thus not inde-
pendent. This is not necessarily a realistic model of
the way natural populations behave, but rather gives
an insight into natural conflicts and how (and in
what way) behaviour may be much more complex
than that predicted by classical 2-player game the-
ory. The dependence between games leads to behav-
iour which is qualitatively different to that from con-
tests where the pairwise contests are independent.
It was shown in Broom et al. (2000) that there
may be more or less aggression in a population play-
ing a contest with a knockout format than in inde-
pendent pairwise games, providing that there is no
possibility of adjusting the strategy from round to
round, depending upon the number of players and
the rewards and costs involved. In Section 2.3 we
see that when there is free choice of behaviour from
round to round, the level of aggression increases the
more rounds there are, and is more than for inde-
pendent contests. Thus this freedom is damaging to
the individuals, but will nonetheless evolve into the
population.
In Section 2.3 it is shown that for a population or-
ganised into an n round knockout tournament with
two available options, in the variable option case
there may be as many as 2n ESSs, but there is a sim-
ple commonly satisfied condition which if satisfied
guarantees at most one ESS. It is shown in Section
2.4 that there might be no ESS at all (in 2-player
game theory there is always an ESS when there are
two strategies). It appears that any Nash equilibrium
is less likely to be an ESS than for classical theory,
since even the existence of a sequence of ESOs is not
sufficient to guarantee an ESS. Thus there are extra
conditions to be met for a strategy to be an ESS than
in 2-player game theory. In particular a completely
internal equilibrium is especially susceptible to in-
vasion; the more pure options involved in the ESOs
which make up the Nash equilibrium strategy the
more susceptible it is (similarly, the more rounds,
the more susceptible it is). Thus in real populations
the number of observed options which occur in real-
ity might be lower if there is a structure to the games
that are played. However, it should be noted that
there is a reverse tendency as well, since different
pure options may be involved in the ESO for differ-
ent rounds, thus increasing the overall number of
pure options used in total.
As we have seen, the game can be very complex
if players are able to change their strategies from
round to round. For two options, strategies are vec-
tors not just single numbers (for more than two op-
tions they are matrices rather than vectors). A recur-
sive dynamic programming method was found
which specifies all the candidate ESSs of a game.
Showing when a candidate ESS is actually an ESS is
a harder problem. In Section 2.4 we do this for the
2 round case. The method used can be generalised to
more rounds, but calculations quickly become
complicated. Section 2.5 shows that the dynamics
of these games is also more complex than those
for 2-player games. Indeed the example given is
the simplest possible non-trivial knockout game (2-
round, 2-option D = ‰) and it is to be expected that
even more complicated behaviour will result from a
more complex game. There is an interesting corre-
spondence between the knockout model and the ex-
tensive two-person game of Selten (1983), which
deserves to be explored further.
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APPENDIX
A) A recurrence relation for yk
The following argument finds a recurrence relation
for y
k
. In general for a population playing the mixed
strategy (p
1
, , p
n
) each placer has a probability of
‰ of being eliminated in any round, and the ex-
pected cost for a player in round k is
X p
c
p
c
k k k= + - +
2 11 2 22
2
1
3
( )
p p c ck k( ) .1
1
2
1
2
21 12- +
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
+ -
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
D D
It follows that
W
V V V V
k
k k
k k
= + + + + -- -
- -
1 2 1
1
0
12 4 2 2
...
- = -
- -
=
-
å
X v Yi k i k k
i
k 1
2 11
1
where
Y
X
k
k
k i
i
k
=
- -
=
-
å
2 11
1
Y
k
is thus the expected future cost incurred by a
player which wins in round k and
Y
X
Y
Y
Xk
k
k i
i
k
k
k
k= Þ = +
- -
=
-
+å
2 211
1
1 .
It is now possible to find y
k + 1
in terms of yk.
W v Y
v V Y
k k k
k k k
+ + += - = + - -1 1 1
2 2 2
- = +
-
X v V vk k k k( )2 1
Þ = + -+W
W V
Xk
k k
k1
2 2
Þ - = - ++ +2 1 1( ) ( )W V W Vk k k k
2 21( )V V Xk k k- -+
Þ + - =+ +2 21 1 1C W Vk kD ( )
= - + + - + -+D D D( ) ( )W V C V V C Xk k k k k1 1 12 2
Þ = + -+y
y
a Xk
k
k k1
2
D
(a
k
is as defined in Section 2.3).
We now rearrange the expression X
k
to get it into
a more manageable form.
X p
c
p
c
k k k= + - +
2 11 2 22
2
1
2
( )
p p c ck k( )1
1
2
1
2
21 12- +
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
+ -
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
D D
= + +p C Ck
2
1 2( )
p C C
c c c
k - - + -
æ
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ç
ö
ł
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+1 2
11 22 22
2 2 2
Þ = - + - +X C C p pk k k( ) ( )1 2 1
1
2
111 22[ ( )].c p c pk k+ -
B) Conditions for an ESS for the 2 round
2-player game
Notation
We define and then evaluate a series of terms which
help us to find whether p is an ESS.
h
i
: the proportion of O1-players in round i,
i = 1, 2.
g
i
(r): the probability of an r-player playing in
round i winning, i = 1, 2, r = p or q.
vi(r): the expected contribution to the payoff of an
r-player of a loss in round i, i = 1, 2, r = p or
q.
E(r): the expected total payoff of an r-player in
the game, r = p or q.
Also define u
1
= (p
1
 q
1
)[1  2 D (p
2
 q
2
)] and u
2
=
(p
2
 q
2
).
The above expressions can be used to find the
payoff functions E(p) and E(q), and in particular
their difference.
E(p) = v
2
(p) + v
1
(p) + g
2
(p)g
1
(p)V
0
,
E(q) = v
2
(q) + v
1
(q) + g
2
(q)g
1
(q)V
0
Þ E(p)  E(q) =
[v
2
(p)  v
2
(q)] + [v
1
(p)  v
1
(q)] +
+ [g
2
(p)g
1
(p)  g
2
(q)g
1
(q)]V
0
. (5)
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ESS conditions
Thus we nee to evaluate all the terms given in (5).
These equations are labelled (618); some lower
numbered equations are required to solve those
which come later. An indication of which (if any)
are required is given after each equation.
h p q p u2 2 2 2 21= - + = -( )e e e (6)
g p h p q2 2 2 2 2
1
2
1
2
( ) ( ) ( )p = + - = + -D De
= +
1
2
2De u (7)
using (6).
g q h p q2 2 2 2 2
1
2
1
2
1( ) ( ) ( )( )q = + - = - - -D D e
= - -
1
2
1 2D ( )e u (8)
using (6).
h p g q g1 1 2 1 22 1 2= - +( ) ( ) ( )e ep q
= - - + - - -p p q p q p q1 1 1 2 2 1 12 1e e e( ) ( ) D( )( )
= - - -p u u p q1 1
2
2 1 12e e D ( ) (9)
using (7) and (8).
g p h1 1 1
1
2
( ) ( )p = + - =D
= + + -
1
2
21
2 2
2 1 1D De eu u p q( ) (10)
using (9).
g q h1 1 1
1
2
( ) ( )q = + - =D
= - - + + -
1
2
21 1 1
2 2
2 1 1D D D( ) ( )p q u u p qe e (11)
using (9).
v V c p h2 2 11 2 2
1
2
( ) ( )p = - +
1
2
12 12 2 2-
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
- - +D ( ) ( )V c p h
1
2
12 21 2 2+
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
- - +D ( )( )V c p h
1
2
1 12 22 2 2( )( )( )V c p h- - - (12)
using (6).
v V c q h2 2 11 2 2
1
2
( ) ( )q = - +
1
2
12 12 2 2-
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
- - +D ( ) ( )V c q h
1
2
12 21 2 2+
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
- - +D ( )( )V c q h
1
2
1 12 22 2 2( )( )( )V c q h- - - (13)
using (6).
v g V c p h1 2 1 11 1 1
1
2
( ) ( ) ( )p p= - +
ì
í
î
1
2
11 12 1 1-
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
- - +D ( ) ( )V c p h
1
2
11 21 1 1+
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
- - +D ( )( )V c p h
1
2
1 11 22 1 1( )( )( )V c p h- - -
ü
ý
þ
(14)
using (7) and (9).
v g V c q h1 2 1 11 1 1
1
2
( ) ( ( )q q)= - +
ì
í
î
1
2
11 12 1 1-
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
- - +D ( ) ( )V c q h
1
2
11 21 1 1+
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
- - +D ( )( )V c q h
1
2
1 11 22 1 1( )( )( )V c q h- - -
ü
ý
þ
(15)
using (8) and (9). We can now combine the above
expressions and then substitute into equation (5).
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v v p q c c2 2 2 2 11 21
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= - - + + -( )[ ( ) ]p q h C C y W2 2 2 1 2 2 2D
= + -u u C C W2 2 1 2 2[ ( ) ]e D
using (12) and (13).
v v1 1( ) ( )p q- =
( ( ( )[ ( )g p g q h C C2 1 2 1 1 1 2p) q)- - + +
y W1 1- +D ]
[ ( ) ( )] ( )g g h V c2 2 1 1 21
1
2
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Ø
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1
2
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þ
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g g g g2 1 2 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p p q q- =
1
2
1
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-D De eu u
1
2
1
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æ
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1
2
1
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2 1
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D D Du u u u p q Oe e[ ( )] ( ). (18)
Using the equations (16)(18) we can express
equation (5) as follows (ignoring terms in e 2 and
higher orders).
E E u W( ) ( ) {p q- = - +D 2 2
1
2
1
2
2 0 2 1 1 21u V u p V c+ - +
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ł
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The constant term in equation (19) is D u
2
multiplied
by (W
2
+ the payoff to a O
2
-player in the final when
everyone plays p = (p2, p1)). Note that the probabil-
ity of winning in the final for a O
2
-player in this case
is ‰  D p1. But W2 is the expected payoff to a player
which wins in the first round, i.e. reaches the final
when everyone plays p. Since p is the equilibrium
strategy the payoff to O
1
-players in the final is the
same as that to O
2
-players, and thus equals W
2
.
Hence the constant term is zero.
Therefore the difference in the payoffs E(p) 
E(q) reduces to the term in e , i.e.
E E u C C u C C( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p q- = + +
ì
í
î
+ +e 2
2
1 2 1
2
1 2
1
2
D Du u V V p C C1 2 0 1 1 1 2[ ( ) ( )- + + +
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2
1
2
21 22+
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ö
ł
÷
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ü
ý
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D c c ] .
Using the fact that
p
V V C
C C
1
0 1 1
1 2
=
- +
+
D ( )
,
E E u C C u C C( ) ( ) { ( ) ( )p q- = + + + +e 2
2
1 2 1
2
1 2
1
2
D D Du u V V c1 2 0 1 212
1
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( )- + +
æ
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ç
ö
ł
÷
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Ø
º
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12-
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Using an alternative substitution we obtain
E E u C C u C C( ( ( ) ( )p) q)- = + + + +e{ 22 1 2 12 1 21
2
D u u p C C c c1 2 1 1 2 11 222 1
1
2
1
2
( )( ) }.- + + -
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
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From (20) the third term is positive when D = ‰ i.e.
( )( )2 1
1
2
1
2
01 1 2 11 22p C C c c- + + - >
Þ - > - +
1
2
1
2
11 22 1 2c c C C( ).
The expression (21) is thus positive if u
1
and u
2
have
the same sign. For a strategy q = (q
1
, q
2
) to invade the
equilibrium, therefore, the probability of playing op-
tion O
1
must be greater than that for the equilibrium
in one round and less than that for the equilibrium
for the other round. It is possible under some condi-
tions to find such a strategy (see below).
Expression (20) is a quadratic equation in u
1
and
u
2
. It is positive for all u
1
and u
2
, i.e. p is an ESS, if
and only if
D D D{ ( )2
1
2
0 1 21V V c- + +
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
-
- -
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
< +
1
2
212
1
2
1 2D c C C} ( )
(in fact u
1
and u
2
are bounded, but u
1
/u
2
is not).
C) 3-strategy ESOs
We define the following parameters:
Let c c i jij ij ij
*
= - "( ) ,1 2D and let
D D D D= + +12 23 31. Further let Cij
i = 1, 2, 3; j = 1, 2 be defined as follows:
C c c c c c c11 12 23 13 22 32 33
1
2
2 2= - - + - + +* * * *( ),
C c c c c c c c c c c c12 12 23 13 32 22 33 12 33 13 22 2
1
4
= + + - - -* * * * * *( 3 32
* *c ),
C c c c c c c21 23 31 21 33 13 11
1
2
2 2= - - + - + +* * * *( ),
C c c c c c c c c c c c22 23 31 21 13 33 11 23 11 21 33 3
1
4
= + + - - -* * * * * *( 1 13
* *c ),
C c c c c c c31 31 12 32 11 21 22
1
2
2 2= - - + - + +* * * *( ),
C c c c c c c c c c c c32 31 12 31 21 11 22 31 22 32 11 1
1
4
= + + - - -* * * * * *( 2 21
* *c ).
In Vickers and Cannings (1988) the 3-strategy pay-
off matrix is written as
0
0
0
a b
c d
e f
Ø
º
Œ
Œ
Œ
ø
ß
œ
œ
œ
and it is shown that for there to be an internal ESO it
is required that
ad + bf  df > 0,
ae + cf  ac > 0,
and bc + de  be > 0.
Let y
1k
= ad + bf  df, then
y, k c c c c c c c c c c= + - - +* * * *
1
4
22 33 12 23 12 33 22 23 22 33(
- - + - -* * * * * *c c c c c c c c c c13 22 32 33 13 32 22 33 23 32
+ +* *c c c c22 23 32 33 )
+ - + +( ) ( )W Vk k
2
12 23 23 31 23
2
D D D D D
+ - - + - -* *
1
2
22 12 33 23 33( )(W V c c c c ck k
+ - + + - - +* * * *c c c c c c c13 22 32 33 23 22 32 )
= - + - +( ) ( ) .W V W V C Ck k k k
2
23 11 12D D
Defining y
2k
= ae + cf  ac and y3k = bc + de  be and
using cyclic symmetry it is easy to show that
y W V W V C Ck k k k k2
2
31 21 22= - + - +( ) ( )D D
and y W V W V C Ck k k k k2
2
12 31 32= - + - +( ) ( )D D
i.e.
y r C r Ck k k1 23
2
11 12= + +D D ,
y r C r Ck k k2 31
2
21 22= + +D D
and y r C r Ck k k3 12
2
31 32= + +D D .
If y
ik
> 0 " i then (p
1k
, p
2k
, p
3k
) is an internal Nash
equilibrium where
p
y
y y y
ik
ik
k k k
=
+ +1 2 3
.
Note that for this strategy to be an internal ESS, the
matrix must satisfy the negative-definiteness condi-
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tion that ( )a c+ , ( )b e+ and ( )d f+ must
form a triangle. Each of these terms only depends
upon the costs cij, so that if the condition is satisfied
by M
k
for any k, it is satisfied for all k.
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